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Abstract 
This viewpoint article was written in response to our attempt to explore mechanisms that promote financial 
‘transparency’ in the minerals and energy extractives. We controversially forward our opinion that the trajectory of 
existing transparency mechanisms is likely to generate an obfuscating mass of disclosed information - not 
‘transparency’. Using a jigsaw analogy, we make a distinction between ‘disclosure’ and achieving the more 
challenging ‘transparency’: it is both being able to have the pieces (disclosure), and put them together to see the big 
picture. It is just as important to identify missing pieces of the puzzle to prevent selective disclosure. We critically 
analyse extractives financial policy, and provide an example where a ‘best practice’ mining securities policy has 
markedly advanced transparency in a major mining state. The policy substantially reduces government financial 
risk of a mining company default at no additional cost; reduces costs to industry around ten-fold; incentivises 
ongoing site rehabilitation; creates a fund for historical abandonments; and; sustains an impressive publically 
available information instrument of disturbed footprints and associated rehabilitation for every tenement at high 
precision on an annual basis. Yet, it still remains deficient in terms of transparency in particular aspects, of which 
we clarify and discuss. 
 
“A lot of people never use their initiative because no-one told them to.” – Banksy 
 
 




The effectiveness of environmental mining securities is a multifaceted issue across the world, and we are 
aware of many jurisdictions experiencing failings within their policies. Here our interest is primarily on disclosure 
of mining securities more than the effectiveness of the mechanisms themselves. Maintaining ‘best practice’ 
administrative and financial mechanisms to achieve transparency and compliance to legal frameworks related to 
mine operation and closure is a major ongoing policy challenge. Ensuring the appropriate level of disclosure, 
 
 
transparency, and accountability of all compliant and non-compliant parties, and accessibility of this information to 
external interested parties is a cornerstone of achieving a well-governed minerals sector. For example, the Mining, 
Minerals and Sustainable Development's (2002, p194) discussion of ‘transparency in the management of mineral 
wealth’ states that governments and companies should openly publish information about how much wealth is 
generated from mining and how it is distributed or spent, that industry organisations should at least consider 
establishing an international and public register of all payments by mining companies to governments, and further 
that NGO watchdog organisations (e.g. such as Transparency International) could bring pressure to ensure that 
open publication regarding mineral wealth does occur.  Similarly, the International Council on Mining and Metals, 
(Miller, 2005; International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM), 2008) highlights the importance of transparency 
and assurances in virtually all aspects of mine closure planning and management for industry and governments 
alike, including projected expenditures for closure costs, distribution of mining revenues, and systems of 
accreditation or certification of financial assurances.  
 In terms of forwarding the adoption and evolution of ‘best practice’ and good governance in the extractive 
industries, in theory true ‘transparency’ should enable all relatively well-educated interested or affected parties to 
access information about an operation, be able to understand it, and put together the greater picture of where the 
finance flows and also the environmental and social consequences. Our approach builds upon the thinking of Fox 
(2007) who noted that transparency and accountability are not synonymous, although there is some overlap of the 
concepts. Tying financial flows together with environmental disturbance and associated rehabilitation, and 
including direct and indirect values (negative and positive, and internal and external), and where/to whom these 
values are passed is complex in policy and is a lofty goal for policy makers. However, to at least aim to develop 
such a mechanism, we propose that policy makers aim to put themselves in the position of an interested individual 
who wants to understand the consequences or outcomes of mining at a particular site: What would they want to 
know? What would be the simplest and most useful way to capture or represent that information? How would the 
information be best maintained at minimum cost and maximum value? How would such maintenance be 
incorporated into existing compliance mechanisms to lower the burden on operators, and also incentivise 
compliance to the law? 
 Taking stock of the existing literature, reform of legislative frameworks is only a starting point for 
changing actual practice, and the capacity and resources (human and capital) of the responsible governing agencies 
to uphold appropriate legislation to extract maximum benefit for the various forms of mining is a key consideration 
(Botham, 2012; Hilson and McQuilken, 2014; Thornton, 2014). Similarly, the effective and active participation of 
civil society organisations and freedom of information (media, opinion, etc.) is expected to empower a citizenry to 
hold governments and extractive entities accountable. However, many developing nations can be characterised as 
having a weak and/or often persecuted civil society, with an ineffective communication with the citizenry 
(Aaronson, 2011; Acosta, 2013), and lack of capacity to monitor even transparency and accountability initiatives. 
Within such contexts, conflicting agendas over resource developments and the distribution of impacts and benefits 
are becoming increasingly relevant socially and politically (Solomon et al., 2008; Labonne, 2014).  
Progressive extractive companies believe that adhering to ‘best practice’ principles of compliance with the 
law and auditable financial accounting processes strengthen a commercial extractive operations’ local and 
international ‘social licence’ to operate and reinforce positive governance to their advantage (Deegan and 
Blomquist, 2006; Holm and Rikhardsson, 2006; Clarkson et al., 2008; Holm and Rikhardsson, 2008; Simnett et al., 
 
 
2009; de Villiers and van Staden, 2010, 2011; Iatridis, 2012, 2013). Indeed a commitment by a mining company to 
‘best practice’ principals is critical to maintain a ‘social licence to operate’ from development to closure, and in some 
jurisdictions a ‘social licence’ can be as important as a regulatory licence (Solomon et al., 2008; Department of 
Industry Tourism and Resources and 2009). Many large mining operations believe that disclosures about their 
activities, productivity, regulatory compliance, and positive environmental credentials are important to their 
investors (Iatridis, 2013). It is widely assumed that companies disclosing voluntary environmental information tend 
to employ less environmentally harmful practices (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008). Yet, and as  
Iatridis (2013) points out voluntary disclosure would not necessarily reflect improved environmental stewardship, 
and more likely result in selective disclosure practices. Crucially, while a ‘social licence’ is often narrowly 
interpreted as a responsibility to a particular local community (Solomon et al., 2008), there are numerous other 
interested and affected parties. These may include mine management, mine employees, neighbouring landowners, 
mining regulators, local authorities, business and service providers, community groups and other non-government 
organisations, financial institutions and the media, all of which can influence decisions (Swart, 2003; Department of 
Industry Tourism and Resources and 2009). In practice, most companies in a competitive global market are often 
unable to adopt higher standards voluntarily unless there is a clear commercial imperative (Kivuiti et al., 2005). In 
some cases more ‘ethical’ business operators are at a competitive disadvantage, particularly when widespread 
corruption exists. 
Despite some specific policy provisions for long-term environmental consequences of mining, the 
equivalent for economic or social consequences is either largely non-existent or underemphasised (Rao and Pathak, 
2009; Marais and Cloete, 2013). Mining company management practices in relation to social issues are often around 
10 years behind environmental management (Solomon et al., 2008). Similarly, research into the social and 
community aspects of mining and mine closure remains poor, in large part because of a lack of systematic, high 
quality, creative data on community networks, human capital, and developmental possibilities (Stacey et al., 2010; 
Botham, 2012). In this context, the generation of consistent and reliable information regarding financial, 
environmental, economic and social characteristics of extractive activities is clearly needed. Indeed, in jurisdictions 
with largely unimplemented legal and regulatory frameworks, labour and commercial laws, and when corruption 
remains a significant issue the availability of transparency of information is imperative (Meeuws, 2004). 
 
2. Publish What You Pay and Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative as examples 
As a global response, Publish What You Pay (PWYP) was launched in 2002 by a coalition of large NGOs 
with the aim of pressuring extractive resource companies to disclose their payments to governments and promote 
improved management of natural resource revenues. In the same year, the Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) - a partnership of governments, industry, civil society and investors - was launched as a global 
transparency standard (EITI, 2011). The aim of the EITI is to facilitiate improved sustainable development and 
allocation of resource revenues and public finances (Haufler, 2010). By early 2014, the EITI had integrated 89 
extractive corporations, 94 institutional investors, 21 partner organisations, 8 members of international civil society, 
27 compliant countries, and 17 candidate countries (EITI, 2014). Similarly, PWYP has grown into a global network 
of more than 800 member organisations in over 40 countries, including coalitions that collaborate at the regional 
level (PYWP, 2014). The high administrative burden and lack of capacity for ongoing effective involvement 
transparency mechanisms was implicitly recognised when EITI++ was launched, a multi-donor trust fund managed 
 
 
by the World Bank providing a full suite of governance and technical support to EITI implementing countries and 
civil society (World Bank, 2013). Despite the growth of these mechanisms they have been criticised for having 
limited effectivenss and not being able to collect data consistently (Hilson and Maconachie, 2008; Ölcer, 2009; 
Brynildsen et al., 2013).  
But the main limitation of the EITI at present is that it misses the opportunity to mandate the inclusion of 
legislated mine rehabilitation and closure information and company compliance, and has little experience with 
disclosure of environmental payments. From the EITI reconciliation reports review's available, only Mongolia and 
Zambia have presented disclosure information on environmental payments (Moore Stephens LLP and Dalaivan 
Audit LLC, 2013; Moore Stephens LLP, 2014). Crucially, financial security payments cannot be considered as 
revenues, and therefore fall outside the scope of EITI. Nevertheless, their inclusion stress the evolving dynamics of 
EITI’s standards, the innovations and diversity proposed by the national multi-stakeholders group from each 
compliant country. We believe that while EITI compliance may improve financial disclosure by mining companies, 
the detail and specificity of the voluntarily disclosed information is insufficiently transparent to third parties 
investigating whether governments and companies are compliant with the law in terms of environmental and 
governance considerations. We would like to see linkage of aggregated international voluntary initiatives (akin to 
the EITI and PWYP) with mandatory jurisdiction-level reforms in mining financial securities and mine closure 
legislation accounted at the tenement level. For illustration, we provide the example of policy development in 
Western Australia to address a major financial liability arising from previous environmental mining security policy 
that generated uncertainty regarding actual mine site rehabilitation costs for a mine in a globally significant mining 
jurisdiction.   
 
When environmental mining securities were introduced into Western Australia (WA) in the late 1980s, it was 
intended that the value of the unconditional performance bonds (UPB) for each mineral tenement fully covered the 
costs of environmental rehabilitation to ensure the State’s financial risk for each site was almost negligible. By 
2012, there were nearly 5,000 tenements with a form of UPB out of a total of more than 23,000 live mining 
tenements in WA. For a variety of reasons, including the workload required to review them, the value of UPBs for 
each tenement did not keep pace with the actual costs of mine site rehabilitation. By 2011 it was found that the 
State was exposed to significant financial risk from inadequate rehabilitation of mine sites after their closure with 
bonds covering less than 25 per cent of the predicted cost of rehabilitating any particular site (Office of the Auditor 
General Western Australia, 2014). A further limitation was that bonds could only be used to remediate the 
tenements for which they were raised. Mining companies were not required to report (either publicly or to the 
government) a transparent level of financial data to enable analysis of UPBs. This was a critical issue as one of the 
key drivers for the policy reform process. This issue faced by the WA Government was a significant contingent 
liability arising from environmental mining securities, and through the Department of Mines and Petroleum (DMP), 
adopted an innovative policy reform process. Without going into details of the process, the result was the Mining 
Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 which established the Mining Rehabilitation Fund (MRF). The MRF is a pooled fund, 
with revenue into the fund generated by non-refundable payments levied upon tenement holders according to the 
environmental disturbance on a tenement at the annual reporting date (Department of Mines and Petroleum, 2014). 
It is a special purpose account vested under the control of the Chief Executive (CE) of the DMP. The interest 
generated is returned to the fund with the Act stipulating it can be used by the CE to pay for costs associated with 
 
 
administering the MRF Act, and on any historical abandoned mine site. The principal in the fund can be used on 
any abandoned mine site covered by the fund; i.e. the pooled finances will enable full rehabilitation of a given site.  
 There are four major outcomes of the policy reform: 1) the financial risk to the WA Government has been 
substantially reduced by the annual revenue enabling any demands from mine site abandonment to be adequately 
addressed; 2) the costs to industry are substantially reduced, with modelling undertaken by the DMP indicating the 
direct and indirect costs of the MRF are approximately ten percent of that of full cost UPBs; 3) the existence of a 
perpetual fund in place to pay for and plan historical abandoned mine rehabilitation; and 4) the level of publicly 
available information related to the environmental footprint of mining has been drastically improved down to the 
level of each hectare disturbed and rehabilitated and it’s detailed condition. This information instrument enables the 
DMP to publicly release the annual reported environmental footprint and reported areas under rehabilitation for all 
tenements in WA - the most comprehensive and up to date data reporting system ever achieved in the state, and 
possibly the world. It is the high-precision level of transparency generated by environmental securities regulation 
that provides confidence to both the government and the community that satisfactory rehabilitation and closure is 
achieved. As the amount paid into the fund for each tenement is based on the disturbed area and condition, there is 
an annual incentive to implement ongoing rehabilitation on a site. At the same time sufficient funds are available to 
government to rehabilitate mine sites in the event of operators not fulfilling their mine rehabilitation and closure 




This leads us to further reflections on transparency of process and outcomes. A government can require a 
process (e.g. disclosure or consultation), but what is the outcome and who knows the outcome? For example, if a 
mining company negotiates with traditional owners, no one else knows the outcome. Testing a mining sector in 
terms of tangible transparency requires ease to put the pieces together, and must also be clear if any of the pieces 
are missing1. As the present levels of disclosure clearly fall short of what might be broadly considered to be 
‘transparent’ to civil society, we suggest that better outcomes can be achieved by linking voluntary international 
transparency commitments from governments with mandatory monitoring, analysis, and enforcement of 
compliance with jurisdictional laws. Such mandatory measures must be clear and publically available, and ideally 
down to the precision of each tenement (akin to the MRF example). We believe that any associated financial 
security payments be designed to both incentivise innovation in mining operations towards international ‘best 
practice’ financially, environmentally, and socially, and improve the institutional capacity of governments and civil 
society to reinforce compliance with the law and keep governments accountable, respectively. 
                                                        
1 For example, at this time the processes within the MRF mean that the public now knows what should have been paid on a 
tenement or mine-site basis, but it is only Auditor General who has access to information about individual payments. Therefore, 
the WA example of the information ‘jigsaw puzzle’ has the social pieces largely missing, with major elements privately 
negotiated between mining companies and certain sectors of the community. While the MRF Act goes some way to improving 
transparency of environmental payments and liabilities, there is some way to go before all pieces of the puzzle are available to 





Then we ask the question: What is ‘best practice’? In our opinion, the theoretical ‘Rolls Royce’ of mining 
transparency or of mine closure planning needs to be able to disclose five key aspects as follows: 
1. What the activity is at the site (i.e. tenement, mine-site, downstream processing, infrastructure, pollution 
such as acid mine drainage, etc.) versus the company (e.g. EITI only considers company level, and the 
issue of transparency at the macro level, which makes it wholly insufficient for civil society to easily 
interrogate larger extractive operators with multiple sites on one jurisdiction); 
2. The level of environmental disturbance matched to a detailed plan to correct/rehabilitate the disturbance 
over time, any incentives to minimise disturbance and/or promote effective rehabilitation, and how success 
of rehabilitation activities will be determined/measured; 
3. Actual historical performance of correcting disturbance (i.e. disturbance and success of rehabilitation);  
4. Social data - affected people are consulted and know of decisions, consultation about final post-mining 
land use and progression towards it, with the social data being available to interested third parties to enable 
the assessment of fairness (particularly for land owners and traditional custodians); and 
5. Financial flows and transfer of money such as royalties, taxes, any other payments from mining companies 
(or affiliated subsidiaries or parent companies) to government or community on an individual mine site 
basis. 
 
Overall transparency of a mining operation (i.e. environmental, social and financial), as represented in the 
five aspects above must be able to be understood by civil society as true ‘transparency’ creates the big picture’, 
whereas disclosure is just presenting the pieces of the puzzle. While the five aspects listed above might appear 
straightforward enough, in reality multiple sources of documentation might need to firstly be assembled before the 
relevant pieces of the puzzle relating to each of the five aspects can be determined, and these documents may be 
lengthy or complex in their own right, as the following example from Western Australia demonstrates. 
 
3.1. Illustration 2: Boddington Gold Mine Extension, Western Australia 
This case highlights the sources and complexity of documentation that a member of the public would have to track 
down and distil in order to understand this well established operation not far from the capital city of Perth in WA. 
The example is based solely on documentation known to be (theoretically) available within the public domain. To 
understand the mining activity at the site (aspect 1) relevant documentation to obtain might include the proponent's 
environmental impact statement (250pp), recommendations of the Environmental Protection Authority (65pp) and 
authorisation by the Minister for the Environment (15pp), as well as other information recorded by the DMP. In the 
Boddington gold mine case, a separate Environmental Management Plan (50pp) and a Mine Closure Plan (290pp) 
were submitted by the proponent with their environmental impact statement (i.e. upholding good practice principles 
for early mine closure planning). Government authorisations specify performance reporting requirements for the 
proponent to uphold, typically annually to begin with and then at less frequent intervals, so understanding the level 
of environmental disturbance (aspect 2) and the proponent's performance (aspect 3) requires piecing together 
successive reports from the proponent to the WA Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) along with any 
responses issued by the Office of the EPA, benchmarked against the Ministerial authorisation statement and the 
current Mine Closure Plan (i.e. these are periodically revised and updated as mining proceeds with greater level of 
detail provided on specific management measures as the life of mine draws closer). Furthermore, tenement holders 
 
 
operating on Mining Act 1978 tenure will be required to report disturbance data and contribute annually to the 
MRF and this information should theoretically be accessible on the DMP website. Initial social data with respect to 
persons consulted (aspect 4) are recorded in the proponent's Environmental Impact Statement and original Mine 
Closure Plan, as well as in the EPA's report on the proposal, and in this case a separate document detailing the 
proponent's response to public submissions (100pp). Thereafter, the periodically updated mine closure plan must 
identify persons consulted including agreement reached about various matters such as final post-mining land use. 
So far, the documentation trail for this case study example mainly involves websites of the EPA and the DMP. It is 
less clear how the financial flows and transfer of money (aspect 5) are to be accessed. Released data showing 
ground disturbance as reported by the tenement holder are publically available on the DMP's website and the 
annual levy charged with respect to application of MRF can be searched by region, type of disturbances and type of 
lease. Unlike the other documentation discussed for the case study which is identifiable by the proponent's name, 
the spreadsheet of data is provided according to tenement number. Separate annual reporting by mining companies 
to the DMP is required regarding royalty payments (Department of Mines and Petroleum, 2014). The fundamental 
point of the WA example is where public disclosure and ready access to the internet is the norm, it remains an 
arduous task to see the ‘big picture’. Even when the conditions for disclosure are fulfilled, solving ‘the puzzle’ 
remains challenging due to the forms of disclosure, leading to ‘true transparency’ being obfuscated.  
 
4. Conclusions 
In an ideal world comparative simplicity would prevail, and transparency and accountability alike would be 
delivered (Fox, 2007). To achieve ‘best practice’ transparency in the mining sector, one option may be visual 
mapping (instead of lengthy reports)2 to provide an embodiment of the pieces of the puzzle through the timeless 
adage; ‘a picture is worth a thousand words’. Similarly, financial flows might simply be included in a spreadsheet3. 
We propose the unit of the tenement and determine (either individually or aggregated) financial, social, and 
environmental impacts4, with changes in the social impact incorporating royalties5, and community/Indigenous 
elements6. 
                                                        
2 We suggest exploration for the most practical and transparent means to visually represent data, including the mine site itself. 
For example, the 31 categories of MRF classification may be shown with various colour or contrasting patterns. Also at the 
community/regional level, attention should be paid to social and environmental activities on land or areas surrounding the mine 
site/tenement (e.g. schools, health clinics, jobs, local procurement, even potentially offsets, etc.). 
3 The simplest way to represent numeric financial data is with spreadsheets that include environmental expenditures and social 
expenditures. This will likely require qualitative clarification for the various elements that are difficult to simply quantify. 
Each spreadsheet may be prepared annually, with the ability to sum cumulative amounts over multiple years. 
4 The environmental impact is simply the annual disclosure of the level disturbance and associated rehab on a type of 
disturbance and area basis, consistent with a MRF-based system. 
5 The social impact incorporating royalties can be quantified to an extent by back-calculating production on a value basis. 
6 The social element enables creative elements with respect to legacy infrastructure. This can be in terms of minimising a 
company with a MRF (or similar) liability by using their mine closure plan to define their intent to negotiate with local 
governments and communities about transferring their assets (such as roads, power, and dams) at a predetermined 
state/condition, and the costs of the associated operation and maintenance. By allocating a commensurate portion/percentage of 




An argument has been made that ‘best practice’ transparency in the mining sector enables stakeholders to readily 
understand the environmental, social, and financial outcomes of mining, extending beyond simple disclosure. 
Arguably, however, current mine closure and rehabilitation policy only extends to standards of disclosure. We have 
indicated some of the complexity of putting the pieces of the ‘mining puzzle’ together by illustrating the Western 
Australian cases where despite high levels of transparency, the number, size, and disparate location of 
documentation poses a challenge to understanding the practical outcomes of a mining activity. Ultimately it is 
desirable for comparative simplicity in transparency using simple means to convey information that enables the 
collation of the pieces of the puzzle. This provides a reasonable and balanced amount of disclosure appropriate to 
the mine site to enable stakeholders to easily see the ‘big picture’, and importantly to identify if pieces are missing. 
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